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I. Introduction
Immigration law has always been interesting and controversial. Yet in
2018, it became disproportionately so. Law and policymakers identified
issues such as unlawful migration, the border between the United States and
Mexico, Muslim immigration, and even high-skilled worker visas as critical
election issues in anticipation of the 2018 midterm election. Additionally,
the current U.S. Executive Branch has taken a hardline approach to
immigration, pursuing opportunities to limit, rather than expand, access by
non-citizens to U.S. opportunities. As a prime policy example, the fact that
U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS), that is responsible for
processing immigration and naturalization applications and establishing
policies regarding immigration services, changed its mission statement from
"America's promise as a nation of immigrants" to "protecting Americans,
securing the homeland, and honoring our values" gives us a perspective of
the scope of the transformation.' From the Trump-era immigration policy
changes that include family separations, to indefinite detention with no right
to bond hearings, to the horrors of denying asylum to victims of domestic
violence, to forcefully "outing" same sex partners of diplomats, we will
review some of the new American immigration reality.
II. The Trump Administration's Discreet and Indiscreet Hurdles
of Immigration Law2
This administration has put in place policies styled to intentionally thwart
and remove immigrants from entering or establishing themselves in this
* Kevin Fandl is Assistant Professor, Fox School of Business, Temple University. Former
Counsel to the Assistant Secretary, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement. Ph.D.,
George Mason University, 2010. J.D., M.A., American University, 2003. B.A., Lock Haven
University, 1998. Betina Schlossberg is Principal at Schlossberg Legal, pllc in Ann Arbor, MI,
where she contributes to the "Melting Pot." L.LM., DePaul University College of Law, 2019.
J.D. Wayne State University Law School, 2007. LL.B Universidad de Buenos Aires- Facultad
de Derecho y Ciencias Sociales, 1998.
1. About Us, U.S. CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIG. SERV. (Mar. 6, 2018), https://www.uscis.gov/
aboutus.
2. Pooja Mehta is partner at Dalal & Mehta, an Immigration and Family law firm in New
Jersey. She is a graduate of New England School of Law Boston and Rutgers University.
PUBLISHED IN COOPERATION WITH
SMU DEDMAN SCHOOL OF LAW
THE YEAR IN REVIEW
AN ANNUAL PUBLICATION OF THE ABA/SECTION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
316 THE YEAR IN REVIEW [VOL. 53
country. Ultimately, attorneys and pro se litigants will have a significantly
more difficult time than before to legalize their status.
A. EXECUTIVE BRANCH
Congress alone has authority to change immigration laws;3 however, the
Executive Branch has limited powers to regulate immigration for the welfare
of the country.4 The Attorney General is "statutorily charged," along with
the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), to
administer and enforce immigration laws. 5 The Attorney General can
exercise "this authority on his own motion or through the referral of cases to
him by the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) or the Secretary of the
[DHS.]"6 Certification power is a powerful tool allowing the Attorney
General to "pronounce new standards for the agency and overturn
longstanding BIA precedent."7 Since 1956, the policy has been used
sparingly at most.8
The current administration is using USCIS to set immigration policies.
One example is the criminalization of asylum seekers leading to mass family
separation as a method to stop migrants from seeking asylum.9 A key
provision of the 1951 United Nations Refugee Convention was that "no
Contracting State shall expel or return a refugee in any manner to . ..
territories where his life or freedom would be threatened."o In 1967 the
U.S. became a signatory." In 1980, Congress enacted The Refugee Act,
conforming domestic law with the Convention.12 Thus, though asylum
seeker entries into the country are generally charged as civil violations, they
may be deemed criminal violations under certain circumstances. 3
On April 6, 2 018, former Attorney General Jeffrey Sessions (AG Sessions)
issued a memorandum directing federal prosecutors and immigration
officials to enforce President Trump's zero-tolerance policy by more
3. Hon. Alberto R. Gonzalez & Patrick Glen, Advancing Executive Branch Immigration Polity
Through the Attorney General's Review Authority, 101 IowA L. REV. 841, 844.
4. Matt Ford, The President's Extreme Immigration Powers, THE NEW REPUBLIC (Jan. 8,
2018), https://newrepublic.com/article/1465 46/presidents-extreme-immigration-powers.
5. Id. at 850.
6. Id. at 846-47.
7. Id. at 847.
8. Id. at 847, 894-95.
9. See generally, Geneva Sands, 81 children separated at border since Trump's executive order on
dividing families, CNN (Dec. 6, 2018), https://www.cnn.com/201 8/1 2/O6/politics/immigrant-
family-separations-children-border-undocumented/index.html.
10. Sharon A. Healy, The Trend Toward the Criminalization and Detention of Asylum Seekers, 12
HUMAN RIGHTS BRIEF 14, 14 (2004).
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. For a general discussion, see Healy, supra note 10.
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aggressively criminally charging people who enter illegally.' 4 Since then, all
those who illegally enter endure criminal prosecution. 15 Prosecution
required parents to serve time in detention facilities, where children are not
legally allowed.16 Thus, immigration officials forced separations between
parents and children.' All children were turned over to the U.S. Health and
Human Services Department, responsible for placing the child with a
sponsor as the child's immigration case was resolved. 8
Another policy change was the July 13, 2 018 USCIS Policy Memorandum
titled "Issuance of Certain RFEs and NOIDs. 'I19 USCIS rescinded its
decades-long review standard for benefit application. Now, adjudicators
may issue denials without sending a Request for Evidence or Notice of
Intent to Deny to correct an application's flaw if the application (1) has no
legal request for the benefit, or (2) if all the required initial evidence was not
submitted with the request. USCIS is also making extra effort to validate all
contentions within any application. Minor omissions of facts can lead to a
misunderstanding that cannot be corrected without the issuance of a Request
for Evidence or Notice of Intent to Deny. Resultantly, denied family and
employment-based cases will cause loss of status and possible deportation
issues.
Yet another change of policy came in the August 9, 2018, USCIS Policy
Memorandum regarding "Accrual of Unlawful Presence and F, J, and M
Nonimmigrants. '"20 Previously, if the government found an international
student on a F-I or J- 1 status had violated his/her status, the individual did
not start accruing unlawful presence until the date that the USCIS or an
immigration judge determined that a violation occurred.21 Under the new
14. See Am. IMMIGR. COUNCIL, PROSECUTING MIGRANTS FOR COMING TO THE UNITED
STATES 1, 3 (May 1, 2018), https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/research/
immigration-prosecutions.
15. See Q&A: Trump Administratiouns "Zero-Tolerance" Immigration Polity, HUMAN RIGHTS
WATCH (Aug. 16, 2018, 8:00 AM), https://www.hrw.org/news/2018/08/16/qa-trump-
administrations-zero-tolerance-immigration-policy#ql.
16. See Q&A: Trump, supra note 15.
17. Id.
18. See Miriam Valverde, What you need to know about the Trump administration's zero-tolerance
immigration policy, POLITIFACT (June 6, 2018, 10:3 8 AM), https://www.politifact.com/truth-o-
meter/article/2018/jun/06/what-you-need-know-about-trump-administrations-zer/.
19. U.S. CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGR. SERV., PM-602-0163, POLICY MEMORANDUM: ISSUANCE
OF CERTAN RFES AND NOIDs; REVISIONS TO ADJUDICATOR'S FIELD MANUAL (AFM)
CHAPTER 10.5(A), CHAPTER 10.5(B) (2018), https://www.uscis.gov/sites/defaultlfiles/USCIS/
Laws/Memoranda/AFM 10 Standards for RFEs and NOIDsFINAL2.pdf.
20. F nonimmigrants are foreign students, J nonimmigrants are exchange visitors (such as
research scholars and professors), and M nonimmigrants are foreign vocational students. See
U.S. CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGR. SERV., PM-602-1060.1, POLICY MEMORANDUM: ACCRUAL OF
UNLAWFUL PRESENCE AND F, J, AND M NONIMMIGRANTS (2018), https://www.uscis.gov/sites/
default/files/USCIS/Laws/Memoranda/2018/2018-08-09-PM-602-1060.1 -Accrual-of-
Unlawful -Presence-and-F-J-and-M-Nonimmigrants.pdf.
21. See USCIS Changing Policy on Accrued Unlawful Presence by Nonimmigrant Students and
Exchange Visitors, U.S. CITIZENSHIP AND IMMGR. SERV. https://www.uscis.gov/news/news-
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policy, a student or scholar on a F-I or J-I visa would start accruing unlawful
presence from the day after the violation occurred.22 The new policy affects
international students, scholars, and their dependents.23
Limitations of H-1B Nonimmigrant Applications have also been used as a
form of thwarting legal immigration.24 From September 11, 2018, through
February 19, 2019, USCIS will stop the premium processing of Hi-B visa
applications.25 This expedited processing, which adjudicated cases within
fifteen days, allowed employers to have their foreign employees available for
work on the starting dates and avoided the uncertainty and economic harm
of having to wait six months or more. 26
And to make matters worse, citing the "Buy American, Hire American"
executive order, the Trump administration has started to revoke or refuse to
provide H-4 employment authorizations for the dependent spouses of Hi-B
applicants.27 It is expected to be completely cancelled by January 2019.28
Other issues currently being faced by the business industry and USCIS
are: (1) managing inconsistent decisions among similar scenarios, (2)
managing narrowed eligibility criteria without guidance to adjudicators or
the public, and (3) the reality of being placed into deportation proceedings if
renewal applications are denied.29
B. CASELAW
In addition to policy changes in USCIS, three case opinions from 2018
will impact the way individuals go about legalizing their status. First, on
May 17, 2018 in Matter of Castro - Turn, 27 I&N Dec. 271 (A.G. 2018),
then AG Sessions revoked immigration judges' and the BIA's general
releases/uscis -changing-policy-accrued-unlawfuI-presence -nonimmigrant-stndents -and-
exchange -visitors (last updated May 11, 2018).
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. H-lB visas are for those who have employment at a university and have a minimum of a
Bachelor's degree. Comparing Non-Immigrant Visa Statuses ]-1, H-1B, and TN Employment
Options, UT HEALTH SAN ANTONIO INTL' SERV., 2 (Sept. 2018), https://wp.uthscsa.edu/ois/
wp-content/uploads/sites/40/2018/09/Comparison-of-J- 1-H- B-and-TN-visas.pdf.
25. USCIS Extends and Expands Suspension of Premium Processing for H- B Petitions to Reduce
Delays, U.S. CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIG. SERV., https://www.uscis.gov/news/uscis-extends-and-
expands -suspension-premium-processing-h- lb-petitions-reduce -delays (last updated Aug. 28,
2018).
26. Id.
27. Jethro Mullen, Trump to Propose Ending Rule Allowing Spouses of H- B Holders to Work in
U.S., CNN (Dec. 15, 2017, 1:55 PM), https://money.cnn.com/2017/12/15/technology/hlb-
visa-spouses-h4-trump/index.html.
28. See Kritika Bansal, U.S. to Propose Major Changes in H-1B Visas by January 2018, INDIA
TODAY (Oct. 18, 2018), https://www.indiatoday.in/business/story/worry-for-indian-it-firms -us-
to-propose-major-changes-in-h- lb-visas -1370613 -2018-10-18.
29. Nick Kolakowski, Tech CEOs Issue Open Letter Over H-1B, Immigration Concerns, DICE
(Aug. 29, 2018), https://insights.dice.com/2018/08/29/tech-ceos-issue-open-letter-h-lb-
immigration-concerns/.
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authority to administratively close cases, or temporarily close cases, without
deciding them.30 A person with an administratively closed case was still in
removal proceedings, but the case remained inactive and off the docket.31
The tool was beneficial for docket management and prioritization of
caseload. With the decision, these cases will be re-calendared, overflowing
the immigration courts and bringing respondent back into litigation with the
DHS.32
Second, on June 21, 2018, in Pereira v. Sessions, 585 U. S. - (2018),
the Supreme Court of the United States stated that a notice to appear for an
immigration hearing, that does not include a time and place for a hearing,
does not trigger the stop-time rule for an individual's residency clock.33
Specifically, "[a] notice that does not inform a noncitizen when and where to
appear for removal proceedings is not a 'notice to appear under [USC]
section 1229(a)' and therefore does not trigger the stop-time rule." 34 This
opened the doors to thousands of people in courts to apply for relief based
on residency, considering that the stop-time rule arises in conjunction with a
non-citizen's application for relief from removal in the form of cancellation
of removal.
And third, on August 31, 2018, in Matter of Bermudez - Cota, 27 I&N
Dec. 441 (BIA 2018), the BIA narrowed the decision of Pereira v. Sessions
(referenced above) saying that 8 CFR § 1003.14(a) vests jurisdiction with the
immigration court when a charging document is filed.35 Because the
regulation does not specify that the charging document contain time and
place of the hearing, the BIA reasoned there was no jurisdictional problem.36
The BIA also stated that if a notice of hearing specifying this information is
later sent to the alien, it fulfills the requirements of section 239(a) of the
Act.37
I1. U.S. Supreme Court Weighs in on Indefinite Civil
Detention of Immigrants38
In ]ennings v. Rodriguez, the U.S. Supreme Court weighed in on whether
the statutes governing detention of so-called "mandatory detainees" by
immigration authorities were properly interpreted by the federal appellate
courts to require periodic bond hearings.39 At issue was the continued
30. See Castro Turn, 27 I. & N. Dec. 271, 293 (A.G. 2018).
31. See Castro, 27 I&N at 272 273.
32. See id. at 273.
33. See Pereira v. Sessions, 138 S. Ct. 2105, 2108 (2018).
34. Pereira, 138 S. Ct. at 2110.
35. See Bermudez-Cota, 27 I. & N. Dec. 441, 444 (B.I.A. 2018) (interim decision).
36. See Bermudez-Cota, 27 I. & N. Dec. at 445.
37. Id. at 447.
38. Sabrina Damast, Law Office of Sabrina Damast. JD Cardozo School of Law 2011. BA
New York University 2008.
39. See Jennings v. Rodriguez, 138 S. Ct. 830, 836 (2018).
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detention of three classes of immigrant detainees.40 The first class, known as
arriving aliens, consisted of non-citizens who had been detained after
applying for admission at a port of entry and included asylum seekers and
long-term permanent residents (sometimes referred to as "green card
holders") who had committed certain criminal offenses or other immigration
violations and then traveled abroad.41 The second class consisted of
immigrants who had committed certain types of criminal offenses, regardless
of whether they had subsequently applied for admission at a port of entry.
Prior to the advent of the Rodriguez litigation, neither of these classes of
detainees were entitled to bond hearings. The third class consisted of other
detainees who were eligible for a bond hearing, but who had either been
denied bond at this initial hearing, or remained detained after 180 days
because of an inability to pay the bond amount set during the initial
hearing.42
The litigation, which arose out of the Central District of California, had
already been to the Ninth Circuit three times prior to arriving at the
Supreme Court. The third decision of the Ninth Circuit employed the
constitutional avoidance canon of statutory construction to determine that
each of these statutes, no matter how mandatory the language regarding
detention, must be read to allow for periodic bond hearings, lest they
implicate due process concerns. 43 Specifically, the Ninth Circuit crafted a
review scheme whereby members of each of these classes would be entitled
to a bond hearing every six months, regardless of the statutory basis for their
detention. Moreover, the government would bear the burden in these
hearings of proving by clear and convincing evidence that the detainee was a
flight risk or a danger to the community, such that continued detention was
justified.44
The Supreme Court disagreed with the entirety of the Ninth Circuit's
analysis. It found nothing in the language of the statutes authorizing
detention of the first two classes of people to authorize bond hearings at any
time. Thus, the canon of constitutional avoidance was not applicable, as
there were no competing plausible interpretations of the statutory text.45
Even the third class of detainees fared poorly before the Supreme Court.
While the Court recognized a clear statutory basis for according one bond
hearing to these individuals, it found nothing in the statutory text to support
periodic bond hearings or the burden of proof set forth by the Ninth
Circuit.46
Though the Supreme Court roundly rejected the statutory interpretation
of the Ninth Circuit, that did not resolve the controversy. The Supreme
40. SeeJennings, 138 S. Ct. at 836.
41. See id. at 833.
42. See id.
43. See id. at 833.
44. See id. at 847 48.
45. ]ennings, 138 S. Ct. at 842 43, 845.
46. Id. at 847.
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Court recognized the possibility that the Constitution itself might mandate
bond hearings for these classes of individuals who were suffering prolonged
and seemingly indefinite detention. Because the District Court that
originally issued the injunction had never considered a constitutional basis
for its ruling, the Supreme Court remanded for consideration of the
constitutional implications of the detention scheme. 47
The Ninth Circuit took up that invitation with vigor in Rodriguez v.
Marin.48 Though the court remanded to the District Court to resolve the
constitutional question in the first instance, it included its own strongly-
worded reflection on the matter.49
"We have grave doubts that any statute that allows for arbitrary
prolonged detention without any process is constitutional or that those
who founded our democracy precisely to protect against the
government's arbitrary deprivation of liberty would have thought so.
Arbitrary civil detention is not a feature of our American government. s0
It is clear the Rodriguez saga, which commenced in 2007, is far from over.
The Supreme Court's decision, though almost scolding in its analysis of
the Ninth Circuit's rationale, has not deterred other circuits from
continuing to use the canon of constitutional avoidance to justify bond
hearings for civil detainees subject to prolonged detention by immigration
authorities.5' The willingness of other circuits to recognize the injustice of
indefinite civil detention nearly guarantees that this issue will return to the
Supreme Court.
At a time when thousands of immigrants are waiting in Tijuana to make
their claim for asylum, and the Trump administration seeks to direct all of
them to make their claims at ports of entry (guaranteeing that they will be
classified as arriving aliens and potentially subjecting them to the indefinite
detention that the Ninth Circuit finds so repugnant) or lose their eligibility
for asylum, the legality and future of prolonged civil detention of
immigrants could not be more relevant. We will watch to see how other
circuits handle this issue after the Supreme Court's decision in Rodriguez,
and how the Central District of California will view the constitutional
questions posed on remand.
47. Id. at 851.
48. Rodriguez v. Marin, 909 F.3d 252 (9th Cir. 2018).
49. See id. at 257.
50. Id. at 256.
51. See e.g., Guerrero- Sanchez v. Warden York County Prison, 905 F.3d 208, 223 (3d Cir.
2018).
PUBLISHED IN COOPERATION WITH
SMU DEDMAN SCHOOL OF LAW
THE YEAR IN REVIEW
AN ANNUAL PUBLICATION OF THE ABA/SECTION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
322 THE YEAR IN REVIEW [VOL. 53
IV. Asylum Eligibility for Victims of Domestic Violences2
The 1980 Refugee Act provides for asylum protection for those who can
show that they would be persecuted in their home country "on account of
race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or
political opinion."53 The persecution must be at the hands of the
government or by forces the government is unwilling or unable to control.54
In 2014, after a decades-long battle to recognize asylum eligibility for
victims of domestic violence, the BIA issued Matter of A-R-C-G-, a decision
in which it held that the applicant, who had suffered repugnant abuse at the
hands of her husband, could be eligible for asylum based on the particular
social group of "married women in Guatemala who are unable to leave their
relationship."55 The BIA noted that the DHS conceded that the applicant
had been harmed on account of a cognizable particular social group, but it
further stated that the DHS's position comports with its own requirements
for particular social groups and went on to analyze the delineated group
under its own case law, ultimately finding it cognizable.56
After Matter of A-R-C-G- was issued, immigration judges and the BIA
began granting asylum to some applicants whose cases were based on
domestic violence. But some domestic violence-based cases were still being
denied for various reasons. In December 2015, an immigration judge denied
asylum to A-B-, a Salvadoran applicant who suffered extreme abuse at the
hands of her partner over the course of several years. 57 In December 2016,
the BIA reversed in an unpublished decision, finding, inter alia, that the
applicant had established that she was abused on account of her membership
in the particular social group of "El Salvadoran women who are unable to
leave their domestic relationships where they have children in common."58
The BIA also found that the applicant had established that the Salvadoran
police were unwilling or unable to protect her from the abuse. 59 The BIA
remanded for the completion of background checks.60 On remand, however,
the immigration judge again refused to grant asylum, questioning whether
Matter of A-R-C-G- was still good law in his court's jurisdiction, and
certified the case back to the BIA.61
52. Anjum Gupta, Professor of Law, Judge Chester J. Straub Scholar, and Director of the
Immigrant Rights Clinic, Rutgers Law School. J.D., Yale Law School, 2003. L.L.M.,
Georgetown Law, 2013. B.A., University of Michigan Ann Arbor, 1999. Samantha Rumsey,
Staff Attorney/Fellow, Immigrant Rights Clinic, Rutgers Law School. J.D., Seton Hall Law
School, 2014. B.A., The College of William and Mary, 2010.
53. Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-12, 94 Stat. 102.
54. Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 222 (B.I.A. 1985) (interim decision).
55. A-R-C-G- Et Al., Respondents, 26 I. & N. Dec. 388, 388 (B.I.A. 2014) (interim decision).
56. See A-R-C-G-, 26 1. & N. Dec. at 392 395.
57. See A-B-, Respondent, 27 I. &. N. Dec. 316, 321 (A.G. 2018) (interim decision).
58. See A-B-, Respondent, 27 I. & N. Dec. at 321.
59. See A-B-, - I. & N. Dec. 1, 3 (B.I.A. 2016) (interim decision) (unpublished).
60. See A-B-, - I. & N. Dec. at 4.
61. See A-B-, Respondent, 27 I. & N. Dec. at 321 322.
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Before the BIA could act, then AG Sessions invoked a previously seldom-
used regulation giving him the authority to certify the BIA's original
decision to himself.62 He called for potential amici to opine on the question
of whether victims of harms committed by private actors could qualify for
asylum based on the protected category of particular social group. 63
Organizations and individuals submitted at least eleven amicus briefs
demonstrating, inter alia, that it was well established in the BIA and every
federal circuit court that individuals who experienced or feared harm by
non-state actors could qualify for asylum, so long as they could show that
their home country's government was unwilling or unable to control the
persecutors. 64 Nevertheless, on June 11, 2018, the AG Sessions issued a
sweeping decision vacating the BIA's unpublished decision in Matter ofA-B-,
as well as its 2014 published decision in Matter of A-R-C-G-.65
Despite the decades of precedent holding that victims of harms committed
by private actors could be eligible for asylum, AG Sessions stated that Matter
of A-R-C-G- "caused confusion because it recognized an expansive new
category of particular social groups based on private violence."66 AG
Sessions further assailed the BIA's decision in Matter of A-R-C-G- for
completing only a "cursory analysis." 67
Performing his own analysis, AG Sessions found that "[s]ocial groups
defined by their vulnerability to private criminal activity likely lack the
particularity required under [BIA precedent], given that broad swaths of
society may be susceptible to victimization."68 He further found that"narrow" social groups such as the one proposed in A-R-C-G- "will often
lack sufficient social distinction to be cognizable" and are often merely "a
description of individuals sharing certain traits or experience."69 He further
reasoned that particular social groups must not be defined by the harm
feared, and that the BIA erred in failing to consider that "the inability 'to
leave' was created by harm or threatened harm."70 Yet, the Attorney General
himself failed to consider that there are often other factors-societal,
cultural, and personal-that prevent women from leaving abusive
relationships.
With respect to the state action requirement, AG Sessions emphasized
that an applicant "must show more than 'difficulty ... controlling' private
62. See 8 C.F.R. 1003.1(h)(1)(i) (2018).
63. See A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 227, 227 (A.G. 2018) (interim decision).
64. See e.g., Brief Amici Curiae of Sixteen Former Immigration Judges and Members of the
Board of Immigration Appeals Urging Vacatur of Referral Order in Support of Respondent at
19, A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 227 (A.G. 2018) (interim decision) (No. 18043060). One brief was
filed in opposition to Ms. A-B-
65. See A-B-, Respondent, 27 I. &. N. Dec. 316, 317 (A.G. 2018) (interim decision).
66. See A-B-, Respondent, 27 I. & N. Dec. at 319.
67. Id. at 331.
68. Id. at 335.
69. Id. at 336.
70. Id. at 335.
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behavior."r' Relying on three cases cherry picked from the circuit courts, he
continued to state: "The applicant must show that the government
condoned the private actions or at least demonstrated a complete
helplessness to protect the victims."r2 He gave no rationale for adopting this
heightened standard and departing from the well-established "unwilling or
unable" standard.
With respect to the requirement that the persecution have a nexus to a
protected ground, AG Sessions opined, "private criminals are motivated
more often by greed or vendettas than by an intent to 'overcome [the
protected] characteristic of the victim.'"r3 In the Attorney General's
opinion, the BIA in Matter of A-R-C-G- failed to show that the abuser
attacked the victim because he was aware of and hostile to her social group.
"Rather, he attacked her because of his preexisting personal relationship
with the victim."r4
It is worth noting that although A-B-'s claim was based on domestic
violence, AG Sessions attempted in dicta to broaden the scope of the
decision to other types of claims based on harms committed by private
actors. For example, he stated, "[g]enerally, claims by aliens pertaining to
domestic violence or gang violence perpetrated by non-governmental actors
will not qualify for asylum."r5 Similarly, in a footnote, he cast doubt on
Matter of L-E-A-, a case in which the BIA held that an applicant's family
could constitute a particular social group in some circumstances. 6 He
further attempted, in dicta, to expand the scope of the decision beyond the
procedural posture of the case before him. Although A-B- had been denied
asylum after a hearing, AG Sessions suggested that such cases could be
denied even without a hearing.rr
Because the Attorney General remanded the case back to the immigration
judge, the decision has not been directly appealed to the circuit court. But
several cases in which Matter of A-B- is implicated are currently on appeal at
the various circuit courts. It remains to be seen whether the circuit courts
defer to the Attorney General's decision in whole or in part. In the
meantime, the DHS has given asylum officers explicit instructions to follow
the BIA's holdings in Matter of A-B-,r8 and immigration judges must follow
71. Id. at 337 (quoting Menjivar v. Gonzales, 416 F.3d 918, 921 (8th Cir. 2005) (quoting
McMullen, 17 I. & N. Dec. 542, 546 (B.I.A 1980))).
72. See A-B-, Respondent, 27 I. &. N. Dec. 316, 317 (A.G. 2018) (interim decision) (quoting
Galina v. INS, 213 F.3d 955, 958 (7th Cir. 2000)).
73. See A-B-, Respondent, 27 I. & N. Dec. at 337 (quoting Kasinga, 2 11. & N. Dec. 357, 365
(B.I.A. 1996)).
74. Id. at 339.
75. Id. at 320 (emphasis added).
76. Id. at 333 n.8 (discussing L-E-A-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 40 (B.I.A. 2017)).
77. A-B-, 27 I. &. N. at 320 n.1.
78. U.S. CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIG. SERV., POLICY MEMORANDUM: GUIDANCE FOR
PROCESSING REASONABLE FEAR, CREDIBLE FEAR, AND REFUGEE CLAIMS IN ACCORDANCE
WITH MATTER OF A-B- 1, 1 (2018), https://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/USCIS/Laws/
Memoranda/2018/2018-06-18-PM-602-0162-USCIS-Memorandum-Matter-of-A-B.pdf.
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the decision to the extent that it does not conflict with relevant federal
circuit court precedent, making obtaining asylum more challenging for
thousands of immigrants nationwide.
V. DOS Policy - The Problem with Umbrellas79
The problem with umbrellas is that they cover such a small space. There
is just enough shelter to keep maybe a couple of people relatively dry, as
long as they remain tightly huddled together beneath the short canopy above
them, even while the storm continues to rage in the world around them.
When the Supreme court decided Obergefell v. Hodges,8° many in the gay
community believed the rain had stopped, and that having achieved the goal
of marriage equality, we had finally reached the pot of gold at the end of the
rainbow.8I Others were more wary, particularly concerned by Justice
Kennedy's nestling of same-sex rights within the penumbral right of
privacy.82 Obergefell frames marriage equality as a due process protection of
the fundamental right to marry-it does not, nor does it seek to, extend
equal protection to gay individuals as members of a constitutionally
protected class.83 Among the wary, some believed that Obergefell, with its
veneration of marriage as a fundamental attribute that makes a person
complete, portended less of a right to marry than a mandate to marry.84
This fear fully manifested this year, as the Trump administration
instituted a policy that reverses the pre-Obergefell and pre- Windsor State
Department policy of issuing derivative visas to unmarried same-sex partners
of diplomats.85 The new policy insists, now that same-sex marriage is
federally legal in the United States, that in order for foreign same-sex
partners of diplomats to join their partners in the United States, they must
79. Stewart Chang, Professor of Law, William S. Boyd School of Law, University of Nevada,
Las Vegas. Ph.D. University of California, Irvine, 2010. J.D. Georgetown University Law
Center, 1999. M.A. Stanford University, 1996. B.A. University of California, Los Angeles,
1995.
80. See generally, Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S.Ct. 2584 (2015).
81. See generally, Alphonse A. Gerhardstein, At the End of the Rainbow?, 34:1 GPSOLO 12
(2017); Akhil Reed Amar, Anthony Kennedy and the Ghost of Earl Warren, SLATE: OUTWARD
(July 6, 2015, 4:17 PM), https://slate.com/human-interest/2015/07/obergefell-v-hodges-
anthony-kennedy-continues -the -legacy-of-earl-warren.html.
82. See, e.g., Katherine Franke, "Dignity" Could Be Dangerous at the Supreme Court, SLATE:
OUTWARD (June 25, 2015, 4:16 PM), http://www.slate.com/blogs/outward/2015/06/25/
in the scorns same sex marriagecase_a_dignity-rationale-could be dangerous.html; Nan D.
Hunter, The Undetermined Legacy of 'Obergefell v. Hodges', THE NATION (June 29, 2015), http://
www.thenation.com/article/the -undetermined-legacy-of-obergefell-v-hodges/.
83. See Obergefoll, 135 S.Ct. at 2604 2605.
84. See e.g., Erez Aloni, Deprivative Recognition, 61 UCLA L. REV. 1276 (2014); Stewart
Chang, Is Gay the New Asian?: Marriage Equality and the Dawn of a New Model Minority, 23
AsuANAm. L. J. 5, 6 7 (2016).
85. Edward Wong and Michael Schwirtz, U.S. Bans Diplomatic Visas for Foreign Same-Sex
Domestic Partners, N.Y. TINES (Oct. 2, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/02/us/
politics/visa-ban-same-sex-partners-diplomats.html.
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get married. The Trump administration's new policy regarding same-sex
partners of diplomats demonstrates just how small of a shelter marriage
equality is for the gay and lesbian community.
Typically, diplomatic visa holders are allowed to have qualifying family
members, namely spouses and children, join them in the United States
under derivative visas. But until very recently, same-sex partners of primary
visa holders had been ineligible for derivative visas, even if they were
married. In Adams v. Howerton, which predated the Defense of Marriage Act
(DOMA), the Ninth Circuit limited "marriage" to opposite-sex couples for
the purpose of immigration benefits.86 It was in the Howerton era that the
Obama administration created an exemption for same-sex domestic partners
of diplomats to be allowed derivative visas in November 2008.87 Citing how
the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations requires that family
members of the same household of a diplomat be accorded the same
privileges and immunities as the primary visa holder, Secretary of State
Hillary Clinton extended the definition of "family" to include same-sex
domestic partners. 88 This exception was made with the understanding that
not all foreign countries granted marriage rights to same-sex partners. Also,
even if their same-sex marriages were valid under foreign law, the United
States government would not recognize those marriages on the federal level
because of DOMA, even if individual states did.
After United States v. Windsor, which invalidated significant portions of
DOMA,89 Secretary of Homeland Security Janet Napolitano directed
United States Citizenship and Immigration Services to review immigration
petitions filed on behalf of same-sex spouses "in the same manner as those
filed on behalf of an opposite-sex spouse."90 Yet despite the drastic shift in
immigration policy immediately after Windsor, the State Department policy
on derivative visas for same-sex domestic partners of diplomats remained in
place.
The continued policy highlights the diversity of how same-sex relations
are treated across the world as not all diplomats and their same-sex partners
may have access to marriage. While some countries recognize same-sex
marriage, most do not, and others still criminalize same-sex sexual relations.
In this way, the Department of State policy was sensitive to the fact that
same-sex relationships in the international context are distinct from
86. See Adams v. Howerton, 673 F.2d 1036, 1043 (9th Cir. 1982).
87. See U.S. Dep't of State, Diplomatic Note 18-1029 1 (2009) https://www.state.gov/
documents/organization!284115.pdf.
88. See generally Carol Morello, State Department Changes Visa Rules for Same-Sex Partners of
Foreign Diplomats, THE WASHINGTON POST, Oct. 2, 2018, https://www.washingtonpost.com/
world/national-security/state-department-changes-visa--ules-for-same-sex-partners-of-foreign-
diplomats/2018/10/02/8121759a- c651-1 1e8 -9blc- a9Ofldaae3O9_story.html?utm term=.32964
43d45de.
89. See U.S. v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744, 775 (2013).
90. Implementation of the Supreme Court Ruling on the Defense of Marriage Act, U.S.
CITIZENSHIP & IMMIG. SERV., https://www.uscis.gov/archive/archive-laws/implementation-
supreme -court-ruling-defense-marriage-act (last updated July 2, 2013).
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opposite-sex relationships and have separate struggles and complications.
Marriage is not a one-size-fits all solution for many same-sex couples across
the world. Equal treatment for same-sex couples, then, must take into
account the ways in which same-sex relationships are treated differently in
the global context.
Obergefell, however, does not take into consideration these global nuances.
In the mind of Justice Kennedy, marriage is the necessary end of any same-
sex couple who wishes to be treated equally with opposite-sex couples.91
Rather than engage in equal protection analysis and the question whether
same-sex couples are to be treated with the same dignity and respect as
opposite-sex couples, Kennedy employs a universalist argument that
marriage is a universal right that should be enjoyed by all people. Under the
due process analysis that Justice Kennedy employs, marriage rather than
equality becomes the focal point, and it is under the umbrella of the
fundamental right to marry that equality is understood and realized. When
equal protection for same-sex couples is confined within marriage, those
who do not subscribe to the institution remain unprotected by their own
choice. Instead of giving the relationships of same-sex couples the same
benefits and protections as marriage, Kennedy anoints marriage as the
exclusive means to enjoy those benefits and protections. Furthermore,
rather than recognize sexual orientation as a classification deserving equal
protection across the board, Obergefell assures equality for same-sex couples
only in the context of the fundamental right to marriage. Same-sex couples
have the right to access marriage only in the same way as everyone
universally has the same right to access those benefits.
Justice Kennedy assumes, however, that marriage indeed applies
universally, forgetting that up until the moment that he penned his decision,
that the United States was among the majority of countries that did not
completely recognize same-sex marriage. Marriage is not a universal
solution that affords protection for many same-sex couples in the world. By
not taking an equal protection approach, Justice Kennedy leaves open the
possibility of continued unequal treatment of same-sex couples outside the
parameters of marriage. Inside the United States, marriage does not protect
same-sex couples from many forms of discrimination, including in the
workplace or by other private citizens. Some same-sex couples who married
immediately following Obergefell were fired when they returned to work.92
Masterpiece Cakeshop v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission left the issue of
whether there could be religious exemptions to state anti-discrimination
91. See generally Obergefell, supra note 80.
92. Katherine Franke, Giving Obergefell the "Roe- Treatment," COLUMB. L. SCH.: THE LAW,
RIGHTS, AND RELIGION PROJECT (July 13, 2015), http://blogs.law.columbia.edu/publicrights
privateconscience/2015/07/13/giving-obergefell-the -roe- treatment; Naomi Shavin, Gay
Couples Can Marry Now, But They Can Still Be Fired for Being Gay, NEW REPUBLIC (June 26,
2015), https://newrepublic.com/article/1 22181/gay-couples-celebrating-today-could-be-fired-
monday-being-gay.
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laws unsettled. 93 Outside the United States the risks to same-sex couples is
often greater. Sexual conduct between members of the same sex remains
illegal in many countries, where it can be punishable by imprisonment,
corporal punishment, or even death.94 Marriage may make same-sex couples
from countries with anti-sodomy laws publicly visible and put them in
danger of arrest and prosecution once they return to their countries.
The prior State Department policy took an equal protection approach to
same-sex relationships, recognizing that those relationships are sometimes
different from marriage, but should enjoy the same benefits. By contrast,
the new Trump administration policy that forces diplomats and their same-
sex partners to marry in order to remain together while in the United States
exposes the regional myopia of Obergefell and of the American marriage
equality movement as a means of obtaining rights for same-sex couples.
Marriage is a frame that only a privileged few in limited parts of the world
have the luxury of fully embracing. Even though marriage equality was
viewed as the final destination of gay rights advocacy in the United States,95
it is by no means the answer in other parts of the world. Indeed, the rain did
not stop with Obergefell-the decision affords only a small dry patch in a
localized corner, while the downpour continues in the wider world outside.
The Trump administration policy coerces same-sex diplomatic couples to
take temporary shelter under the tight space of the Obergefell umbrella, only
to push them back out into the exposure of the global storm once their terms
of service are up.
VI. Conclusion
There is much more to say, but the limitations of this publication allow us
only to provide this narrow perspective on the realities of immigration law
and policy today. Vhile the struggle to balance the legal rights of U.S.
citizens with aliens goes on, the struggles of immigrant parents looking for
their children, American employers looking for foreign employees, and
immigration practitioners trying to adjust to a new normal, continue. We
remain hopeful as practitioners that the coming year brings new
opportunities to defend not only the rule of law, but also the principles of
openness and opportunity that this country was founded upon.
93. See Masterpiece Cakeshop v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission, 138 S.Ct. 1719, 1732
(2018).
94. See generally, Avani Uppalapati et al., International Regulation of Sexual Orientation, Gender
Identity, and Sexual Anatomy, 18 GEORGETOWN J. GENDER & L. 635 (2017).
95. See Jeremiah A. Ho, Weather Permitting: Incrementalism, Animus, and the Art of Forecasting
Marriage Equality After U.S. v. Hindsor, 62 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 1, 7 (2014).
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